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505 
THE TROUBLE WITH TRANSFERS: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE REFERRAL OF UWINKINDI 
TO THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA FOR TRIAL  
I. OVERVIEW 
On June 28, 2011, in Prosecutor v. Uwinkindi,1 the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR” or “Tribunal”) invoked a procedural rule to 
transfer a genocide case from the Tribunal to the Rwandan judiciary for the 
first time.2 This decision was approved on appeal,3 and Uwinkindi now sits 
before the High Court of Rwanda as the first person to be indicted by the 
ICTR, but prosecuted by Rwanda.4 The ICTR has since approved the transfer 
of seven more accused genocidaires to Rwanda, six of whom remain at 
large.5  
The transfer mechanism, Rule 11 bis, was adopted in 2004 as part of a 
completion strategy, which allowed the ICTR to transfer cases to national 
judiciaries. But, prior to Uwinkindi, the Tribunal had denied similar 
applications for transfer due to the failure of the Rwandan judiciary to meet 
the requisite conditions. Two key elements were at issue: (1) the assurance 
that the accused would receive a fair trial6 and (2) certainty that the death 
penalty would not be imposed.7 The Rule 11 bis jurisprudence illustrates that 
the Tribunal struggled in determining the appropriate standard for evaluating 
whether the fair trial element would be satisfied. In so doing, the Tribunal 
came full circle, beginning and ending with a rigid statutory analysis. 
 
 
 1. Case No. ICTR-2001-75-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic 
of Rwanda (June 28, 2011), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Uwinkindi/decisions/110628 
.pdf.  
 2. Case of Jean Uwinkindi Referred for Trial to the Republic of Rwanda, INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL 
FOR RWANDA (June 28, 2011), http://www.unictr.org/tabid/155/Default.aspx?id=1216.  
 3. Uwinkindi v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-75-AR11bis, Decision on Uwinkindi’s Appeal 
Against Referral of His Case to Rwanda and Related Motions (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.unictr.org/ 
Portals/0/Case%5cEnglish%5cUwinkindi%5cdecisions%5c111216.pdf. I will confine my analysis to the 
Trial Chamber’s decision to transfer, as it provides a more thorough basis for analysis. Furthermore, the 
Trial Chamber’s holdings on the issues relevant to this Note were all affirmed in the Appeals Chamber. 
See id. 
 4. See Rwanda/Justice—Uwinkindi to Appear Before a Judge on Thursday, HIRONDELLE NEWS 
AGENCY (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.hirondellenews.org/ictr-rwanda/409-rwanda-justice/33086-rwan 
dajustice-uwinkindi-to-appear-before-a-judge-on-thursday.  
 5. See ICTR/Referrals—Eighth and Last ICTR Case Transferred to Rwanda for Trial, HIRONDELLE 
NEWS AGENCY (June 28, 2012), http://www.hirondellenews.org/ictr-rwanda/407-collaboration-with-
states/collaboration-with-states-rwanda/33409-280612-ictrreferrals-eighth-and-last-ictr-case-transferred-to 
-rwanda-for-trial. 
 6. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to 
the Republic of Rwanda, ¶¶ 22–43. 
 7. Id. ¶¶ 44–51. 
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Under this framework, the Tribunal evaluated the rights conferred to the 
accused under Rwanda’s Transfer Law—a law written specifically for the 
purpose of fielding cases transferred from the ICTR. However, as recognized 
early on by the Tribunal, this law did not reflect the reality of fair trial and 
sentencing in Rwanda. Consequently, the Tribunal engaged in an alternative 
inquiry into the factual reality of the circumstances in Rwanda. Due to flaws 
in the structure of the factual inquiry and pressure to transfer, the Tribunal 
reverted to the statutory framework analysis to approve Uwinkindi’s transfer. 
This shift is particularly interesting because the Tribunal’s original concerns 
regarding the realities of fair trial in Rwanda remained unresolved. Through a 
monitoring mechanism included in Rule 11 bis, the ICTR will monitor the 
proceedings which, coupled with international scrutiny, is predicted to ensure 
that Uwinkindi will receive a fair trial. However, the ICTR’s approval of 
transfer has led other countries to begin extraditing accused persons to 
Rwanda, which persons will not enjoy the benefits of monitoring or high-
level international scrutiny. In the end, the Tribunal’s decision to transfer has 
undermined any possibility of effecting real change in the Rwandan judiciary, 
and those who are soon to be extradited may be unintended casualties of the 
U.N.’s completion strategy. 
This Note will provide a brief overview of the Rwandan genocide, the 
U.N.’s establishment of the Tribunal, and efforts to bring the Tribunal to a 
close. It will then examine the transfer applications that preceded Uwinkindi, 
the shifts in precedent that ultimately led to transfer, and, in conclusion, will 
assess the wisdom of the transfer itself. This approach focuses on the parallel, 
but sometimes contravening, goals of maintaining the provision of due 
process and fairness through the structure of an international court and the 
preservation and improvement of this process in the courts of the country 
where the crime occurred. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Rwandan Genocide 
The western world is familiar with Hollywood’s version of Rwanda’s 
1994 tragedy through Hotel Rwanda, a popular film which tells the story of 
one man’s efforts to protect a group of Tutsis from becoming victims of 
genocide.8 But history’s details prove difficult to capture in a three-hour 
movie.  
 
 
 8. HOTEL RWANDA (United Artists 2004). 
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Ancestors of the Hutu and Tutsi people settled in Rwanda more than two 
thousand years ago.9 It was not until the twentieth century when these settlers 
began to acquire their Hutu and Tutsi labels, which were used to identify 
Rwandans as cultivators or pastoralists, respectively.10 For many years, these 
two groups coexisted, creating and sharing the same language, religious 
beliefs, and cultural identity.11 In the 1920s, Belgian colonialism led to the 
bifurcation of the Hutu and Tutsi, and the origin of their labels was soon 
forgotten.12 The colonialists appointed Tutsis into official positions of the 
newly created administrative machine, while they relegated Hutus to mass 
labor.13 To enforce this order, the Belgians implemented a group registration 
system, under which all adult Rwandans were required to carry identification 
cards stating their ethnicity.14 In the 1950s, decolonization pressure led to a 
restructuring of the Tutsi-led administration, which included Hutu integration 
into that system.15 But with integration came revolution,16 and so began a 
lengthy period afflicted with sporadic warfare in Rwanda.17  
On April 6, 1994, the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi were killed when 
the plane they were flying in was shot down by an unidentified party.18 Hotel 
Rwanda accurately portrays what happened next: widespread civilian-
executed genocide, resulting in the death of 500,000 to 800,000 Tutsis, 
 
 
 9. ALISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 31 (1999). 
 10. Id. at 32–33. The etymology of these labels reveals that Hutu historically meant “subordinate or 
follower of a more powerful person,” while Tutsi meant “a person rich in cattle.” Id. Most Rwandans 
married within their occupational class, which created distinctive gene pools amongst the Hutu and the 
Tutsi people. Id. at 34. “This practice . . . meant that over generations, pastoralists came to look more like 
other pastoralists—tall, thin and narrow featured—and cultivators like other cultivators—shorter, stronger, 
and with broader features.” Id.  
 11. Id. at 31. (The Hutu and Tusti people “developed a . . . highly sophisticated language, 
Kinyarwanda, crafted a common set of religious and philosophical beliefs, and created a culture which 
valued song, dance, poetry, and rhetoric. They celebrated the same heroes: even during the genocide, the 
killers and their intended victims sang of some of the same leaders from the Rwandan past.”). 
 12. See id. at 34–37. 
 13. Id. at 35. 
 14. Id. at 37. 
 15. Id. at 38. 
 16. Id. at 38–40. As colonial rule came to a close, the Belgian administrators attempted to integrate 
Hutus into the administrative system that they had previously reserved to the Tutsi. Id. at 38. Hutus were 
named to administrative posts and admitted into secondary schools. Id. Integration had serious 
consequences. Id. The Tutsi fought to preserve the monarchy and their power within it, while the taste of 
opportunity left the Hutu hungry for more. Id. This polarization led to violence, and the Belgians 
responded with yet another plan: democratization. Id. Under the banner of democracy, the Belgians 
replaced half of the local Tutsi authorities with Hutus. Id. at 39. Shortly thereafter, the Hutu revolution 
ensued, and the Tutsi monarchy came to a close. Id.  
 17. See id. at 30–48.  
 18. Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 
365, 390 (1999). 
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together with a far smaller number of moderate Hutu victims.19 During the 
early stages of the genocide, U.N. peacekeeping troops were present in 
Rwanda; but having foreseen the horrors to come, countries began to 
evacuate their troops and diplomats, leaving the Tutsis alone to fight against 
their own genocide.20 In July of 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a 
rebel force of Tutsi exiles, took control of the country through military 
force.21 Paul Kagame led the RPF in that movement and later assumed the 
presidency.22 While the atrocities certainly receded under RPF control, they 
did not end.23 Rather, the Hutu and Tutsi swapped roles as perpetrators and 
victims. Following the RPF takeover, the U.N. High Commissioner launched 
an investigation that revealed RPF-led civilian massacres, political 
assassinations, and summary executions, with Hutus as the victims.24 Human 
Rights Watch also documented these crimes and concluded they were “wide-
spread, systematic and involved large numbers of participants and victims.”25 
B. RPF Detention Campaign 
In a multifaceted plan to bring about justice, the new Tutsi regime 
launched an aggressive arrest and detention campaign that resulted in the 
arrests of more than 130,000 Hutus by 1998.26 But Rwanda’s channels for 
justice had been destroyed along with its people, and holding formal trials for 
 
 
 19. See DES FORGES, supra note 9, at 15–16. Others have estimated that as many as 1,000,000 Tutsis 
were killed. See, e.g., Jesse Melman, Note, The Possibility of a Transfer(?): A Comprehensive Approach to 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s Rule 11bis to Permit Transfer to Rwandan Domestic 
Courts, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1271, 1277 (2010).  
 20. See DES FORGES, supra note 9, at 7. 
 21. Leslie Haskell & Lars Waldorf, The Impunity Gap of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda: Causes and Consequences, 34 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 49, 51 (2011). 
 22. See id. at 50; see also Erlinder, infra note 48, at 145. 
 23. See Haskell & Waldorf, supra note 21, at 52 (A team from the U.N. High Commission of 
Refugees “estimated that the RPF killed between twenty-five thousand and forty-five thousand civilians in 
1994.”). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id.; see also YASH GAI, COMMONWEALTH HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE, RWANDA’S APPLICATION 
FOR MEMBERSHIP TO THE COMMONWEALTH: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 
HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE 9 (Aug. 2009) [hereinafter CHRI REPORT] (“The RPF has used an 
extraordinary amount of violence, domestically and internationally, in the pursuit of its illegitimate aims. It 
is responsible for killing almost 500,000 persons, whether citizens or not, and is responsible for the deaths 
of many times more through displacement, malnutrition and hunger. It has denied hundreds of thousands 
of children of the opportunity to go to school, and deprived millions of prospects of family and community 
life.”).  
 26. Melman, supra note 19, at 1277. The arrests and detentions under the new government increased 
steadily, “rising from around 10,000 detainees in 1994 to 130,000 by 1998, at a rate of one thousand to 
three thousand per month.” Id. See also NICHOLAS A. JONES, THE COURTS OF GENOCIDE, POLITICS AND 
THE RULE OF LAW IN RWANDA AND ARUSHA 82 (2010) (“[T]he government employed its military to 
expediently round up suspected genocidaires en masse.”). 
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the myriad suspects proved impossible.27 Accordingly, the Rwandan 
government reached out to the United Nations for help, asking that a tribunal 
be established to adjudicate genocide cases.28  
C. United Nations Intervention and the Creation of the Tribunal 
The Security Council29 responded by passing Resolution 955,30 which 
established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).31 Despite 
Rwanda’s initial request for assistance, there was some dissension over the 
U.N.’s execution of it. The debate surrounding the passage of Resolution 955 
included Rwandan resistance regarding the extent of the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction.32 Specifically, Rwanda opposed: (1) the ICTR’s broad subject 
matter jurisdiction over international humanitarian law;33 (2) the temporal 
jurisdiction, which extended to the end of 1994; and (3) the Tribunal’s refusal 
to impose the death penalty.34 Instead, Rwanda hoped the ICTR’s subject 
matter jurisdiction would be limited to the crime of genocide, thereby 
excluding the prosecution of any war crimes or crimes against humanity 
committed by the Tutsi-led RPF.35 Rwanda also lobbied to minimize the 
Tribunal’s temporal jurisdiction to conclude in mid-July 1994, the date when 
the genocide ended and the RPF crimes began.36  This jurisdictional dispute 
reflects the difference between objectives of Rwanda and those of the 
international community. The new government, comprised of survivors of the 
genocide, sought widespread prosecutions and hoped that the ICTR would be 
another weapon in its arsenal.37 Perhaps driven by a mix of post-genocide 
guilt and philanthropy, the U.N. had its own, broader objective: 
 
 
 27. Melman, supra note 19, at 1277–78. 
 28. Id. at 1278; see also KATE PARLETT, THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 
263 (2011). 
 29. The Security Council is the decision-making organ of the United Nations. It is comprised of five 
permanent member countries and ten non-permanent member countries, each of which has a single vote in 
all U.N. decisions. UN Security Council: Membership in 2012, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/ 
en/sc/members (last visited Sept. 2, 2012). 
 30. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. DOC. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). Substantive resolutions such as Resolution 
955 require nine affirmative votes, five of which must come from the permanent members. See U.N. 
Security Council: Membership in 2012, supra note 29. 
 31. See Melman, supra note 19, at 1278. 
 32. William A. Schabas, International Criminal Tribunals: A Review of 2007, 6 NW. U. J. INT’L 
HUM. RTS. 382, 388–89 (2008). 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Haskell & Waldorf, supra note 21, at 54–55. 
 35. See Schabas, supra note 32, at 388–89. 
 36. See Haskell & Waldorf, supra note 21, at 55. 
 37. See Melman, supra note 19, at 1277–78 (explaining the new government’s aggressive arrest and 
detention campaign and subsequent request for the creation of an international criminal tribunal).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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“reconciliation and . . . the restoration and maintenance of peace.”38 And, to 
that end, broad subject matter and temporal jurisdiction were imperative. The 
text of Resolution 955 suggests that the U.N.’s further-reaching interests 
superseded those of the Rwandan survivors who had requested U.N. 
assistance.39 Under this language, the Tribunal was given primary jurisdiction 
over genocide and crimes against humanity40 occurring in Rwanda during 
1994.41 This Note addresses both the existence of substantive and procedural 
fairness, as well as the appropriateness of available penalties. These elements 
must be present to allow transfer to a national jurisdiction.42 
International criminal law was established to end impunity,43 and a 
primary purpose for the creation of the ICTR was clearly to ensure that 
Rwanda’s genocidaires would not be allowed to act with impunity. 
Importantly, the U.N.’s decision to override Rwanda’s jurisdictional requests 
evidences its concern that the potential for impunity (i.e., the role as the 
persecutors) was not exclusive to Hutus. In another decision to override 
Rwanda, the U.N. refused to include the death penalty as a possible 
punishment.44 The mission then was not only to fight impunity, but to do so 
in accordance the latest principles of human rights—some of which Rwanda 
neither abided by nor agreed with.45 Its desires disregarded by the 
 
 
 38. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 30. This objective finds its roots in Chapter One of the U.N. Charter, 
calling for the maintenance of international peace and security. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1.  
 39. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 30, Annex (establishing jurisdiction over “Genocide and Other Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan 
citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring 
States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994”). 
 40. Id. arts. 2 & 3. Article 4 also authorizes the Tribunal to hear cases involving violations of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949. Id. art. 4. 
 41. Id. art. 7. Primary jurisdiction over the above-mentioned subject matter means that the Rwandan 
judiciary must defer to the Tribunal in cases where there is a jurisdictional overlap. See id. art. 8. If the 
Tribunal is not prosecuting a case that falls under its jurisdiction, Rwanda is free to pursue it. See Melman, 
supra note 19, at 1280–81. However, at any point during the proceedings, the ICTR may request the case. 
See S.C. Res. 955, supra note 30, art. 8. 
 42. See infra note 63. 
 43. See generally Justice Jackson, Opening Statement for the Prosecution in Trial of Major War 
Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal (Nov. 21, 1945). 
 44. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 23 (Jan. 31, 2010) [hereinafter 
ICTR Statute]. 
 45. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (noting Rwanda’s opposition to the ICTR’s refusal to 
impose the death penalty). Since 1994, the Rwandan government has continued in its aggressive pursuit 
for retributive justice, which has often been imposed at the expense of fair trial rights. See, e.g., Paul J. 
Magnarella, Expanding the Frontiers of Humanitarian Law: The International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, 9 FLA. J. INT’L L. 421, 435–36 (1994) (stating that the RPF detained more than 80,000 suspects 
to await trial indefinitely); infra note 52 and accompanying text (noting Rwanda’s suspension of 
cooperation with the ICTR following the ICTR’s acquittal of Barayagwiza due to extended pretrial 
detention). For further discussion on violations of human rights in Rwanda, see generally RWANDA, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss2/6
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organization that had abandoned it in the midst of the horror, Rwanda did not 
respond with cooperation and compliance.46 This difference in perspectives 
on what principles should govern justice has been the source of continued 
tension between the ICTR and Rwanda.47 The Tribunal may have won the 
first battle by appointing itself with broad jurisdiction and refusing to impose 
the death penalty, but in practice, the international community’s objectives 
have tended to give way to those of Rwanda. 
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE TRIBUNAL 
A. Rwandan Residual Control  
Even a brief summary of the history of the Tribunal suggests that 
Rwandan influence over decisions has been difficult to neutralize. Revisiting 
various cases shows how fragile fairness can be. 
1. Barayagwiza 
Since the creation of the Tribunal, its jurisprudence has been colored by 
Rwanda’s influence.48 Perhaps the strongest example of this influence is the 
case of Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza.49 In Barayagwiza, a former foreign 
minister was charged with genocide and crimes against humanity for leading 
an anti-Tutsi party’s participation in the genocide.50 At the ICTR’s behest, 
 
 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES—2003, 
available at 2004 WL 790747 (reporting various abuses of human rights in Rwanda).  
 46. See infra Part III.A. 
 47. Kagame continues to attack the ICTR for its inefficiency, while the ICTR and human rights 
organizations criticize the government of Rwanda for its failure to protect fair trial. Compare Gonza 
Muganwa & Berna Namata, Rwanda: International Justice System a Flop, THE E. AFR., Apr. 18, 2011, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/201104181502.html, with infra Part IV.A (discussing the Tribunal’s 
findings that Rwandan laws were insufficient to guarantee fair trial). Kagame has also criticized the West, 
more generally, for protecting suspects of genocide. See, e.g., Rwanda/Genocide—Paul Kagame Accuses 
Western Countries of Protecting Genocide Suspects, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY, Apr. 7, 2011, http:// 
www.hirondellenews.com/ictr-rwanda/412-rwanda-political-and-social-issues/33005-070412-rwanda geno 
cide-paul-kagame-accuses-western-countries-of-protecting-genocide-suspects. 
 48. See Peter Erlinder, The UN Security Council ad hoc Rwanda Tribunal: International Justice or 
Jurisdicially-Constructed “Victor’s Impunity”?, 4 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 131 (2010); see also Haskell 
& Waldorf, supra note 21, at 55–60. 
 49. Case No. ICTR-97-19, Appeals Chamber Decision (Nov. 3, 1999). 
 50. Eric Husketh, Note, Pole Pole: Hastening Justice at UNICTR, 3 Nw. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 8, 
¶ 7 (2005). Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza was the chairman of the Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique 
in Gisenyi prefecture and was closely associated with powerful genocidiares. Nahimana v. Prosecutor, 
Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 3, 6 (Nov. 28, 2007). He was also an official on the steering 
committee at Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines, id. ¶¶ 3, 359, a radio station that was used to 
incite ethnic contempt against the Tutsi, id. ¶¶ 737–41. 
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Barayagwiza was detained for almost a year prior to his trial.51 The Appeals 
Chamber ordered Barayagwiza’s release on procedural grounds, reasoning 
that his right to a prompt trial had been violated.52 When Rwanda got news of 
Barayagwiza’s release, it attacked the prosecution’s competence and 
immediately withdrew cooperation.53 The prosecutor challenged the appeal 
on grounds of new available facts, and the Chamber changed its mind, 
indicting Barayagwiza but reducing his sentence based on the length of his 
pretrial detainment.54 Whether Barayagwiza’s ultimate indictment was a 
result of Rwandan pressure, or justice through judicial process, is debatable. 
2. Carla Del Ponte 
Another example of Rwandan influence is seen in the fate of former ICTR 
Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte.55 After launching investigations into alleged RPF 
massacres, Del Ponte informed Kagame of her bi-tribal prosecutorial plan.56 
Though Kagame initially expressed support, his actions thereafter looked 
more like reprisal. In June 2002, he impeded witness travel to the ICTR in 
Arusha, Tanzania, requiring witnesses to have three clearance certificates, 
including one confirming the lack of a criminal record.57 Without witnesses 
to testify, the Tribunal was forced to suspend proceedings. Kagame’s 
interference delayed three trials for several months.58 
B. Time Constraints and Introduction of Rule 11 bis 
Finding a way to end the expense and bureaucracy involved in such 
proceedings weighed heavily on the Security Council, which sought eventual 
closure of the Tribunal. An examination of Rule 11 bis as a mechanism for 
facilitating closure follows. Though the rule seemed a good idea at first, it 
ultimately might prove dangerous to those falling outside its protections. 
 
 
 51. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Decision, ¶¶ 3, 100 (finding that the the U.N. had 
constructive custody over Barayagwiza from March 1997 through his trial, which began in February 
1998); see also Husketh, supra note 50, at ¶ 8.  
 52. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Decision, ¶¶ 100–12; see also Husketh, supra note 50, ¶ 8. 
 53. Husketh, supra note 50, ¶ 11.  
 54. Id. ¶¶ 11–12.  
 55. See Haskell & Waldorf, supra note 21, at 56–58; see also Erlinder, supra note 48, at 158–62. 
 56. Haskell & Waldorf, supra note 21, at 56. 
 57. Mary D. Shenk et al., International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for 
Rwanda, 37 INT’L L. 551, 561–62 (2003). 
 58. Haskell & Waldorf, supra note 21, at 57; see also Shenk et al., supra note 57, at 561–62. Prior to 
the government’s withdrawal, two Rwandan genocide survivors’ groups, AVEGA and IBUKA, suspended 
their participation and lobbied the government to follow suit. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss2/6
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1. Adoption of Rule 11 bis 
In addition to challenges relating to control, the Tribunal also faced 
questions regarding how and when to bring the proceedings to a close.59 After 
nearly ten years of operation, efficiency and cost concerns led to a push for 
completion and closure.60 In Resolutions 1503 and 1534, the Security Council 
urged the ICTR to adopt a completion strategy modeling that of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”),61 
specifically, transferring lower-level cases to national jurisdictions.62 
Following these instructions, the ICTR adopted Rule 11 bis (“Rule 11 bis” or 
“11 bis”).63 This rule authorizes the transfer of a case to a national court of 
 
 
 59. See Cecile Aptel, Closing the U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Completion 
Strategy and Residual Issues, 14 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 169 (2008). 
 60. Id.; see also Michael Bohlander, The Transfer of Cases from International Criminal Tribunals to 
National Courts (Nov. 30, 2004), http://unictr.org/Portals/0/English%5CNews%5Cevents5CNov 2004% 
5CBohlander.pdf. Resolutions 1503 and 1534 were applied to ICTR and ICTY alike and were largely the 
result of findings and suggestions from a working group between the Office of High Representative of 
Bosnia (OHR) and International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia. Id. at 19. The OHR-ICTY 
working group suggested the creation of a specialized, three-panel War Crimes Chamber (WCC) to be 
housed in the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Id. at 18.  
 61. In 1993, the UN established the ICTY to try perpetrators of war crimes in the Balkans during the 
conflicts in the region during the 1990s. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). 
 62. S.C. Res. 1503, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003) (“Urging the ICTR to formalize a 
detailed strategy, modelled on the ICTY Completion Strategy, to transfer cases involving intermediate- 
and lower-rank accused to competent national jurisdictions, as appropriate, including Rwanda, in order to 
allow the ICTR to achieve its objective of completing investigations by the end of 2004, all trial activities 
at first instance by the end of 2008, and all of its work in 2010”).  
 63. ICTR R. P. & EVID. 11 bis. Rule 11 bis provides: 
(A) If an indictment has been confirmed, whether or not the accused is in the custody of the 
Tribunal, the President may designate a Trial Chamber which shall determine whether the case 
should be referred to the authorities of the State: 
 (i) in whose territory the crime was committed; or 
 (ii) in which the accused was arrested; or  
 (iii) having jurisdiction and being willing and adequately prepared to accept such a case, so 
that those authorities should forthwith refer the case to the appropriate court for trial within 
that state. 
(B) The Trial Chamber may order such referral proprio motu or at the request of the Prosecutor, 
after having given to the Prosecutor and, where the accused is in the custody of the Tribunal, the 
accused, the opportunity to be heard. 
(C) In determining whether to refer the case in accordance with paragraph (A), the Trial 
Chamber shall satisfy itself that the accused will receive a fair trial in the courts of the State 
concerned and that the death penalty will not be imposed or carried out. 
(D) When an order is issued pursuant to this Rule: 
 (i) the accused, if in the custody of the Tribunal, shall be handed over to the authorities of 
the State concerned; 
 (ii) the Trial Chamber may order that protective measures for certain witnesses or victims 
remain in force; 
 (iii) the Prosecutor shall provide to the authorities of the State concerned all of the 
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competent jurisdiction even after an accused has been indicted at the ICTR.64 
The Trial Chamber may move to transfer on its own initiative, or the 
Prosecutor may apply for transfer.65 The requisite elements for a Rule 11 bis 
transfer are: (1) “that accused will receive a fair trial in the courts of the State 
concerned” and (2) “that the death penalty will not be imposed or carried 
out.”66 This procedural mechanism was intended to lighten the Tribunal’s 
docket and thereby ensure compliance with the completion strategy.67 
Another notable objective of Rule 11 bis is to build the capacity of the 
national judiciary where the atrocities took place.68 This goal aligns with one 
of the original purposes of the Tribunal in its establishment: “to strengthen 
the courts . . . of Rwanda.”69 
The requirements for transfer are particularly interesting in light of the 
Tribunal’s previous decisions to override Rwanda’s wishes for a death 
sentence option. Under the 11 bis conditions, international law would be 
implemented in accordance with current human rights standards, even where 
the case was relinquished to the national jurisdiction. By issuing an 
indictment, the ICTR assumes an obligation to ensure that its indictees 
receive the rights provided for in its statute.70 Without these conditions, the 
ICTR might be the target of blame and criticism for unfair trials and death 
penalties following its indictments. Notably, under Rule 11 bis, it is 
important only that the individuals transferred to Rwanda receive the stated 
protections.71 But the purpose of the 11 bis conditions might have been even 
broader, with the international community maintaining important influence 
over Rwanda. By conditioning transfer on a country’s adherence to certain 
principles, the international community asserts political pressure on that 
country to adopt those principles. Thus, the U.N. might effect change in 
 
 
information relating to the case which the Prosecutor considers appropriate and, in 
particular, the material supporting the indictment; 
 (iv) the Prosecutor may send observers to monitor the proceedings in the courts of the State 
concerned on his or her behalf.  
. . . 
(F) At any time after an order has been issued pursuant to this Rule and before the accused is 
found guilty or acquitted by a court in the State concerned, the Trial Chamber may at the request 
of the prosecutor and upon having given to the authorities of the State concerned the opportunity 
to be heard, revoke the order and make a formal request for deferral within the terms of Rule 10. 
 64. See Rule 11 bis (A), supra note 63. 
 65. See Rule 11 bis (B), supra note 63.  
 66. See Rule 11 bis (C), supra note 63.  
 67. See supra notes 62 and 63 and accompanying text.  
 68. Melman, supra note 19, at 1313–14. 
 69. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 30. 
 70. See ICTR Statute, supra note 44, arts. 20–23 (ensuring fair trial rights and no death penalty). 
 71. See supra note 63.  
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Rwanda, perhaps for the sake of “maintain[ing] international peace and 
security”72 or to “strengthen the courts . . . of Rwanda.”73 However, the way 
in which the ICTR has applied the 11 bis conditions has largely limited their 
effects to benefit only the accused. 
2. Transfer Granted to Non-Rwandan Jurisdictions 
Rule 11 bis was slow to take hold at the ICTR. In 2007, the Tribunal 
invoked the Rule for the first time to transfer Bagaragaza, a genocide case, to 
the Netherlands.74 In assessing whether the conditions for transfer had been 
met, the Tribunal followed ICTY jurisprudence. Shortly after the ICTR 
ordered the first transfer, the Netherlands denied its own jurisdiction over the 
case, forcing the ICTR to revoke the transfer.75 It was not until the end of 
2007 that Rule 11 bis actually—albeit marginally—lightened the docket.76 
Both of the accused were French residents at the time of transfer, and after 
consultation with the ICTR Prosecutor, France agreed to prosecute both 
cases.77 France’s legal framework and ratification of international 
conventions provided the necessary 11 bis assurances for fair trial and 
restrictions against use of the death penalty.78 In evaluating the fair trial 
element, the Tribunal looked to the availability of witness protection under 
French procedure, finding it to be relevant to the provision of fair trial.79  
 
 
 72. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1, supra note 38. 
 73. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 30. 
 74. Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR-2005-86-11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for 
Referral of the Indictment to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 13 (Apr. 13, 2007). 
 75. Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR-2005-86-11bis, Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Extremely Urgent Motion for Revocation of the Referral to the Kingdom of the Netherlands Pursant to 
Rule 11 bis (F) & (G), ¶ 3 (Aug. 17, 2011). The ICTR tried Bagaragaza and sentenced him to eight years 
in prison. Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR-2005-86-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶¶ 44–45 (Nov. 17, 
2009).  
 76. In November 2007, the Tribunal invoked the Rule and handed two accused genocidaires over to 
France for trial. See Prosecutor v. Munyeshyaka, Case No. ICTR-2005-87-I, Decision on Prosecutor’s 
Request for the Referral of Wenceslas Munyeshyaka’s Indictment to France (Nov. 20, 2007); see also 
Prosecutor v. Bucyibaruta, Case No. ICTR-2005-85-I, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of 
Laurent Bucyibaruta’s Indictment to France (Nov. 20, 2007). 
 77. Aptel, supra note 59, at 178, n.39. 
 78. See Bucyibaruta, Case No. ICTR-2005-85-I, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of 
Laurent Bucyibaruta’s Indictment to France, ¶¶ 18–24. In holding that the accused would receive a fair 
trial, the Tribunal reasoned that France ratified the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights in 1974 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1980. Id. ¶ 21. It also noted 
special provisions within French domestic law that guarantee fair trial, such as the independence of the 
courts, the presumption of innocence, and the right of assistance to counsel. Id. ¶ 22. In evaluating the 
death penalty restriction element, the Tribunal found France’s abolition of the death penalty, the provision 
of the Constitution protecting against it, and the French ratification of Protocol No. 13 of the European 
Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to be sufficient. Id. ¶¶ 18–19. 
 79. Id. ¶¶ 26–28. 
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3. Rwanda’s Response  
By 2007 the government had been substantially rebuilt, and its legal 
system had evolved. To manage the post-genocide arrests and need for 
justice, the government revived an age-old tradition of dispute resolution: the 
Gacaca.80 Under this modernized Gacaca system, communities elected to 
each court nine laymen of integrity, who were charged with serving Rwanda 
in its mission to end impunity.81  
In addition to the Gacaca, there was again a working, formal judicial 
system comprised of a multilevel judiciary.82 Also, a new constitution had 
been adopted by referendum in 2003, and one of its most notable provisions 
was the presumption of innocence in judicial proceedings.83 The country was 
making meaningful steps toward becoming one which could adjudicate its 
own problems. Recognizing this maturation and seeking to recover its lost 
sovereignty, the Rwandan government passed the Transfer Law, and the 11 
bis requirements were written into this new legislation.84 Under the Transfer 
Law, fair trial was provided for in principle,85 witness protection programs 
were set to be implemented,86 and the death penalty was abolished.87 At this 
point, under the ICTY precedent and its ICTR progeny, Rwanda’s new legal 
framework arguably demonstrated competence sufficient for transfer.88  
 
 
 80. JONES, supra note 26, at 53. The traditional Gacaca system was a voluntary community-based 
dispute resolution system where a third party helped the disputing parties to craft a resolution or 
punishment. Id. at 54–55. While the modern Gacaca courts were based on the traditional model, there are 
significant procedural and jurisdictional differences between the traditional and modern Gacaca. Id. at 54–
57. One key difference is that, in the traditional system, cases of severe gravity—such as those involving 
murder—were heard by the Mwami (king). Id. The traditional Gacaca’s jurisdiction, on the other hand, 
was limited to less serious disputes between families or clans. Id. at 54. See also Bert Ingelaere, The 
Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, in TRADITIONAL JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT 32 
(Luc Huyse & Mark Salter eds., 2008) (“The ‘new’ Gacaca courts are in the truest sense an ‘invented 
tradition’. . . . State intervention through legal and social engineering has designed and implemented a 
novelty, loosely modelled on an existing institution.”).  
 81. JONES, supra note 26, at 57, 59–60. 
 82. Id. at 89–93. 
 83. RWANDA CONST. art. 19 (2003). 
 84. Organic Law No. 11/2007 of 16 March 2007 Concerning Transfer of Cases to the Republic of 
Rwanda from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and from Other States, Official Gazette of 
the Republic of Rwanda [hereinafter Transfer Law]. 
 85. Id., ch. III, art. 13. Rwanda had also ratified the International Covenant on Civil and International 
Rights, which contains internationally accepted standards on fair trial. See JONES, supra note 26, at 82. 
 86. Transfer Law, ch. III, art. 14. 
 87. Id., ch. VI, art. 21. “A primary reason for the abolition [of the death penalty] was to facilitate the 
rendition of persons to Rwanda that the regime wanted to try for various offences (many countries, 
including those in the EU, do not extradite suspected offenders to a country which has capital punishment 
. . . .).” CHRI REPORT, supra note 25, at 38. 
 88. See Prosecutor v. Munyeshyaka, Case No. ICTR-2005-87-I, Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Request for the Referral of Wenceslas Munyeshyaka’s Indictment to France, ¶¶ 18–19, 21–24 (Nov. 20, 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF SUBSEQUENT CASE LAW: APPLICATIONS FOR 11 BIS 
TRANSFER TO RWANDA 
A. Early Transfer Applications 
In September 2007, ICTR Prosecutor Hassan Jallow filed the first three 
applications for transfer to Rwanda.89 The Tribunal denied its first application 
in Prosecutor v. Munyakazi and rewrote the 11 bis requirements to implement 
a heightened stringency.90 The Tribunal acknowledged Rwanda’s abolition of 
the death penalty but was not satisfied that any punishment imposed would be 
consistent with international standards.91 This hesitancy was based on an 
ambiguity in Rwandan law. Specifically, the Transfer Law abolished the 
death penalty, but the Abolition of the Death Penalty Law provided for “life 
imprisonment with special provisions” (i.e., in solitary confinement).92 The 
Tribunal noted that solitary confinement was an exceptional measure that was 
only appropriate where necessary and proportionate.93 Because Rwanda did 
not have safeguards in place to curtail the imposition of solitary confinement, 
the Appeals Chamber affirmed that “the penalty structure was inadequate, 
and the referral must be denied.”94 In Munyakazi, the Tribunal effectively 
exchanged the restriction on the death penalty element for one that requires 
all potential punishments comport with international standards.95 The 
 
 
2007) (finding French laws and international agreements guaranteeing non-imposition of the death penalty 
and fair trial to be sufficient to support transfer); Prosecutor v. Bucyibaruta, Case No. ICTR-2005-85-I, 
Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of Laurent Bucyibaruta’s Indictment to France, ¶¶ 18–19, 
20–24 (Nov. 20, 2007) (same). 
 89. See Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Request for Referral of Case to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 3 (May 28, 2008) [hereinafter Munyakazi Trial 
Decision]; Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-2002-78-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request 
for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 3 (June 6, 2008) [hereinafter Kanyarukiga Trial Decision]; 
Prosecutor v. Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR-00-55B-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for the 
Referral of the Case of Ildephonse Hategekimana to Rwanda, ¶ 2 (June 19, 2008). 
 90. See Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecution’s 
Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11bis (Oct. 8, 2008) [hereinafter Munyakazi Appeals 
Decision]; see also Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-2002-78-R11bis, Decision on the 
Prosecution’s Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11bis (Oct. 30, 2008) [hereinafter 
Kanyarukiga Appeals Decision]. 
 91. Munyakazi Appeals Decision, ¶¶ 16–20.  
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. ¶¶ 11, 20 (citing the Trial Chamber’s findings). 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. ¶¶ 20–21 (affirming the Trial Chamber’s holding that the potential imposition of life 
imprisonment in isolation precludes transfer). To support its extension of the Rule 11 bis punishment 
prong, the Trial Chamber cited case law from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra note 89, ¶ 21, n.39. (citing Prosecutor v. Stanković, 
Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 34 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia May 17, 2005); Prosecutor v. Todavić, Case No. IT-97-25/1-AR11bis.1, Decision on 
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Tribunal’s position on what constitutes a fair trial also evolved, becoming 
more nuanced and subjective, based on the factual circumstances in 
Rwanda.96 The nuances resulted in the creation and analysis of several factors 
in determining whether a fair trial would in fact be afforded to the accused.97 
These factors included: judicial independence; availability and protection of 
resident witnesses of Rwanda; and the availability and protection of non-
resident witnesses.98 
B. Fair Trial Factorial Analysis 
1. Munyakazi  
In Munyakazi, the Appeals Chamber found the Rwandan judiciary to be 
sufficiently independent, despite the Trial Chamber’s finding of political 
influence over the judiciary.99 The Trial Chamber’s finding rested on 
Rwanda’s suspension of cooperation in response to Barayagwiza’s acquittal 
as well as Rwanda’s reaction to foreign indictments of the RPF.100 In 
rejecting the Trial Chamber’s finding of political influence over the judiciary, 
the Appeals Chamber noted that more than nine years had passed since 
Rwanda’s reaction to the Barayagwiza acquittal.101 Since then, the Tribunal 
had acquitted five people and maintained Rwanda’s cooperation 
throughout.102 In regard to Rwanda’s reaction to foreign RPF indictments, the 
Appeals Chamber was dismissive, stating that such a reaction by Rwanda 
does not mean the country will have a similar response to its own national 
indictments.103 The Appeals Chamber also rejected evidence of political 
influence in national proceedings on grounds that the evidence of such 
 
 
Savo Todavić’s Appeals Against Decisions on Referral Under Rule 11bis, ¶ 99 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia September 4, 2006)). The cited ICTY jurisprudence provides some support for the 
Tribunal’s conclusion that national detention should accord with international standards. See generally 
Prosecutor v. Todović, Case No. IT-97-25/1-AR11bis.1, Decision on Savo Todović’s Appeals Against 
Decisions on Referral Under Rule 11bis, ¶¶ 94–99 (addressing an argument from the defense that the 
national detention was not in compliance with international standards). However, neither Todović nor 
Stanković supports the Munyakazi bench’s decision to roll this principle into an element essential to 
transfer. See generally id. ¶ 97 (noting that the conditions of detention are relevant in considering whether 
the accused would receive a fair trial). 
 96. Munyakazi Appeals Decision, ¶¶ 22–42. 
 97. See id. 
 98. See id. 
 99. Id. ¶¶ 22–31. 
 100. Id. ¶ 22. 
 101. Id. ¶ 28. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id.  
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influence came from the lower Gacaca courts.104 Transfer cases would go 
directly to the High Court per the Transfer Law.105 Accordingly, Rwanda 
prevailed on the judicial independence factor, one of three supportive of a 
finding of fair trial.106  
Rwanda did not, however, receive the stamp of approval for the witness 
protection factor.107 The Trial Chamber found that witnesses’ fear of 
testifying would preclude Munyakazi from receiving a fair trial,108 and the 
Appeals Chamber affirmed.109 Supporting evidence included testimony from 
potential witnesses regarding their unwillingness to testify before the High 
Court of Rwanda for fear of “harassment, torture, arrest, or being killed.”110 
Additionally, witnesses expressed fear of being “accused of adhering to 
‘genocidal ideology’” and facing trial before Gacaca courts.111  
The Appeals Chamber then shifted its focus to the third factor, non-
resident testimony, as the majority of Munyakazi’s witnesses were non-
residents.112 The issue of witness fear of intimidation and threats was similar 
in the non-resident context,113 but Rwanda had attempted to mitigate this 
issue by providing an option to testify via video-link.114 The Appeals 
Chamber found that the video-link option for testimony was not an adequate 
solution.115 It reasoned that the resulting inequities in direct testimony from 
the Prosecution and the Defense witnesses would violate the equality of arms 
principle,116 under which “each party must be afforded a reasonable 
opportunity to present his or her case—including evidence—under conditions 
 
 
 104. Id. ¶ 29. Additionally, the Appeals Chamber refuted the Trial Chamber’s holding that trial by a 
single judge necessarily violated Munyakazi’s right to trial before an independent tribunal. Id. ¶ 26. It 
should be “recall[ed] that international legal instruments, including human rights conventions, do not 
require that a trial or appeal be heard by a specific number of judges to be fair and independent.” Id.  
 105. See id. ¶¶ 28–29; see also Transfer Law, supra note 84, art. 2. 
 106. Munyakazi Appeals Decision, ¶ 31. 
 107. Id. ¶¶ 32–43. 
 108. Id. ¶ 32. 
 109. Id. ¶ 37. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. The Trial Chamber also found that the witness protection program was inadequate due to lack 
of resources, understaffing, and its administration under the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP). Id. ¶ 38. 
Specifically, there was a concern that defense witnesses would fear bias and unfair treatment from the 
OTP. Id. Although it cited the Trial Court’s inadequacy rationale, the Appeals Chamber did not accord 
significant weight to that finding in its analysis. Id. 
 112. Id. ¶ 40. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. ¶ 42; see also Transfer Law, supra note 84, art. 14. 
 115. Munyakazi Appeals Decision, ¶ 42. 
 116. Id.  
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that do not place him or her at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis the other 
party.”117 
Reviewing the totality of the fair trial factors, the Appeals Chamber 
affirmed the Trial Chamber’s refusal to transfer the case to Rwanda,118 
holding that “Munyakazi’s right to obtain the attendance of, and to examine, 
Defence witnesses under the same conditions as witnesses called by the 
Prosecution, cannot be guaranteed at this time in Rwanda.”119  
Munyakazi transformed 11 bis. An inference of this change in the 11 bis 
framework can be ascertained from the Tribunal’s punishment and fair trial 
holdings.120 Under Munyakazi, a statute banning the imposition of the death 
penalty was no longer viewed as sufficient to satisfy the Rule’s punishment 
requirement. Likewise, the fair trial principles in the Rwandan Constitution 
and the Transfer Law were insufficient to satisfy the Rule’s fair trial element. 
By adopting a factorial analysis for evaluating whether the accused could 
expect a fair trial, the Tribunal refuted the Prosecution’s argument that 
statutory safeguards were sufficient to support the requisite 11 bis elements121 
and held that “under the current conditions in Rwanda, the[] laws [are] 
inadequate to guarantee witness protection.”122 The transfer applications to 
follow would therefore be adjudicated based on the “current conditions in 
Rwanda.”123 
2. Reasons for Abandoning ICTY Jurisprudence 
In Munyakazi, both Chambers abandoned 11 bis jurisprudence to deny 
transfer. Up until that point, the ICTR had applied ICTY jurisprudence and 
the transfer plan which preceded it—both of which were written by the 
ICTY.  
A comparison of the relationship between Rwanda and the ICTR and that 
between the former Yugoslavia and the ICTY reveals significant differences. 
For example, the ICTY had various longstanding safeguards built into its 
system to maintain ICTY control over the handling of war crimes by other 
judiciaries. The ICTR, on the other hand, had no real safeguards to ensure fair 
resolution by Rwandan courts. Given Rwanda’s history of political favoritism 
 
 
 117. Prosecutor v. Gatete, Case No. ICTR-2000-61-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for 
Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 71 (Nov. 17, 2008). 
 118. Munyakazi Appeals Decision, ¶ 50. 
 119. Id. ¶ 45. 
 120. Id. ¶¶ 20, 45. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. ¶ 47. 
 123. Id. 
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and suppression of human rights, such safeguards were particularly 
necessary. Because of these relational differences between the tribunals and 
their respective jurisdictions, the statutory framework analysis applied by the 
ICTY was ill-suited for determining whether an accused would receive a fair 
trial in Rwanda.  
Most significantly, the ICTY had been addressing problems of arbitrary 
arrests in the former Yugoslav nations for years. From 1996 to 2004, the 
ICTY had implemented a comprehensive program to neutralize fears of 
arbitrary arrests for war crimes.124 Under the “Rules of the Road” program, 
local prosecutors were obliged to obtain ICTY approval before pursuing any 
arrests for war crimes.125 Balancing its paternalism against benefits to the 
nations, the ICTY also contributed to national prosecutions by turning over 
files to local prosecutors in cases it decided not to pursue.126 After years of 
this successful give-and-take relationship, the ICTY helped establish the War 
Crimes Chambers in Bosnia Herzegovina, a national judiciary that would 
hear transfer cases as well as war crime appeals from lower courts.127 Not 
until it had taken all of these steps did the ICTY apply the statutory 
framework analysis. In contrast, the ICTR spent its formative years trying to 
maintain its primacy over a country that never fully accepted that primacy. 
And during that time, Rwanda and its judiciaries developed a track record of 
political suppression, especially in the context of genocide.  
Under Rule 11 bis, the Tribunal is required to “satisfy itself that the 
accused will receive a fair trial . . . and that the death penalty will not be 
imposed or carried out.”128 Unsatisfied that the statutory framework in 
Rwanda was sufficient to ensure fair trial, the Tribunal tailored its analysis to 
the context in front of it.  
3. The Munyakazi Loophole 
Unfortunately, the ICTR’s new approach in Munyakazi, while insightful, 
was not without flaws. The Munyakazi Appeals Chamber created a loophole 
that would be utilized and stretched in the cases to follow. In its analysis of 
judicial independence, the Appeals Chamber refused to consider evidence of 
political influence over the Gacaca because it would have no bearing on 
Munyakazi’s trial (which would be heard before the High Court). By 
 
 
 124. See Working With the Region, UNICTY, http://www.icty.org/sid/96 (last visited Nov. 12, 2012). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See Bohlander, supra note 60. 
 128. Rule 11 bis (C), supra note 63. 
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explicitly limiting its inquiry to conditions that would affect Munyakazi, the 
Appeals Chamber opened the door for Rwanda to obtain transfer without 
modifying its “current conditions.”  
4. Case Law Following Munyakazi 
Not surprisingly, a week and a half after the Appeals Chamber denied the 
Prosecutor’s request for transfer in Munyakazi, it denied another in 
Kanyarukiga.129 An alternative finding would have been nearly impossible to 
justify, as the “current conditions in Rwanda” were unlikely to have 
undergone a complete transformation in a week’s time. Then, in December 
2007, the Tribunal denied Prosecutor Jallow’s third and final application for 
transfer in Prosecutor v. Hategekimana.130 
Ambitious and determined, Prosecutor Jallow did not retreat, filing a 
fourth application for transfer in November 2007.131 In Prosecutor v. 
Gatete,132 the Tribunal evaluated the conditions of Rwanda as instructed by 
Munyakazi. Of course, some modifications were made, too. First, the Trial 
Chamber severed from the penalty restriction the requirement that any 
punishment imposed comport with international standards.133 The Trial 
Chamber shoehorned that requirement into its fair trial analysis, asserting that 
“conditions of detention in a national jurisdiction . . . touch[] upon the 
fairness of that jurisdiction’s criminal justice system.”134 By shifting the 
 
 
 129. See Kanyarukiga Appeals Decision, supra note 89. The Kanyarukiga Appeals bench relied 
heavily on Munyakazi precedent. See id. ¶¶ 4, 5. The holding and rationale in these back-to-back transfer 
applications were substantially the same, although the Trial Chamber’s opinion in Kanyarukiga expressed 
deference toward Rwanda in contrast to the undertones of distrust in the Munyakazi opinion. Compare 
Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra note 89, with Kanyarukiga Trial Decision. This difference in tone is 
likely due to the fact that the cases were heard in different trial chambers before different judges. For a 
more in-depth analysis on the differences between the trial chambers’ decisions in Munyakazi and 
Kanyarukiga, see Amelia S. Canter, Note, “For These Reasons the Chamber: Denies the Prosecutor’s 
Request for Referral”: The False Hope of Rule 11 bis, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1614 (2008).  
 130. Case No. ICTR-00-55B-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for the Referral of the Case of 
Ildephonse Hategekimana to Rwanda (June 19, 2008). 
 131. See Prosecutor v. Gatete, Case No. ICTR-2000-61-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for 
Referral to the Republic of Rwanda (Nov. 17, 2008). Prosecutor Jallow made another such request in 
November 2010. See Prosecutor v. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s 
Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda (June 28, 2011). 
 132. Case No. ICTR-2000-61-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic 
of Rwanda (Nov. 17, 2008). 
 133. See id. ¶¶ 25, 85–87 (considering the potential imposition of solitary confinement in its fair trial 
analysis as opposed to its penalty structure analysis).  
 134. Id. ¶ 76 (citation omitted). In shifting the punishment element into the fair trial analysis, the 
Gatete bench diverged from the 11 bis framework as set by the appeals chambers in Munyakazi and 
Kanyarukiga. See supra Part IV.A. On the other hand, this shift is in harmony with ICTY case law. See 
supra note 95. The Kanyarukiga Trial Chamber also addressed the potential imposition of solitary 
confinement amongst other fair trial factors, but this approach was abandoned by the Appeals Chamber. 
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solitary confinement question into the multi-factor fair trial analysis, under 
which no single factor is dispositive, the Tribunal created a situation where 
the availability of solitary confinement as a punishment might not bar 
transfer.135 Despite the new, non-dispositive position of the solitary 
confinement question in the analytic framework, the Tribunal’s analysis of 
the issue resembled that of the Appeals Chamber in Munyakazi. Due to 
ambiguity in Rwandan statutory law—the Organic Law allowing solitary 
confinement, and the Transfer Law silent on that subject—the Tribunal was 
faced with uncertainty regarding the potential outcome of any transferred 
case. Such uncertainty was not conducive to transfer.136 
Before applying the fair trial factors, the Tribunal applauded Rwanda for 
its statutory progress, noting that its “legal framework generally mirrors the 
right to a fair trial as embodied in Article 20 of the ICTR Statute.”137 Having 
set a tone of deference to Rwanda and its Transfer Law, the Gatete bench 
proceeded to determine whether the legal framework in fact provided what it 
purported to.138 The application of the Munyakazi factors led to nearly 
identical findings: judicial independence was sufficient to support transfer,139 
while witness protection for residents and non-residents was not.140 
Perhaps due to arguments asserted in briefs from Human Rights Watch 
and International Criminal Defense Attorneys Association,141 the Gatete 
bench applied additional fair trial factors related to the availability of an 
effective defense.142 These factors included consideration of the availability 
 
 
Compare Kanyarukiga Trial Decision, ¶¶ 85, 94–96 (analyzing solitary confinement as a factor bearing on 
“the fairness of [Rwanda’s] criminal justice system”), with Kanyarukiga Appeals Decision, ¶ 7 (assessing 
solitary confinement in connection with the non-imposition of the death penalty). 
 135. Gatete, Case No. ICTR-2000-61-R11bis, ¶ 25 (holding Rwanda “removed one of the 
impediments to transfer of cases from the ICTR”).  
 136. Id. ¶ 87. 
 137. Id. ¶ 31.  
 138. Id. ¶¶ 33–88.  
 139. See id. ¶ 39. The Gatete bench provided rationale resembling that of the Appeals Chamber in 
Munyakazi. Compare Gatete, Case No. ICTR-2000-61-R11bis, ¶ 36 (noting there is no recent evidence of 
judicial corruption in connection with the High Court or Supreme Court, the designated fora for transfer 
cases), with Munyakazi Appeals Decision, ¶ 29 (same). Additionally, the Trial Chamber noted that many 
Hutus have been acquitted in Rwandan ordinary courts, thus providing further support for judicial 
independence. Gatete, Case No. ICTR-2000-61-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to 
the Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 35. 
 140. Gatete, Case No. ICTR-2000-61-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the 
Republic of Rwanda, ¶¶ 64, 72. 
 141. In their briefs, Human Rights Watch (HRW) and International Criminal Defense Attorneys 
Association (ICDAA) raised arguments regarding impediments to Gatete’s right to representation, such as 
the low budget for legal aid and the small community of lawyers within Kigali. Id. ¶ 44.  
 142. Id. ¶ 43. Additional factors considered included presumption of innocence, id. ¶ 40; double 
jeopardy, id. ¶ 73; unlawful and arbitrary arrest, id. ¶¶ 78–79; and conditions of arrest and detention, id. 
¶¶ 80–84. All of these sub-factors were determined to be sufficient for transfer purposes. Id. ¶¶ 40, 73, 78–
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of counsel and legal aid143 and the working conditions for the defense 
attorneys.144 In assessing whether counsel was available to Gatete, the 
Tribunal declared that it had no doubt that Gatete would be able to find 
representation, despite that only approximately 280 lawyers were practicing 
in Rwanda at that time.145 The next factor, the availability of legal aid, 
received a similarly cursory analysis.146 Because the Ministry of Justice in 
Rwanda provided a $500,000 budget for transfer cases, the Tribunal found 
the legal aid factor to be satisfied.147 Diverging from the reality-based 
analysis of Munyakazi, the Tribunal stated that it was not obliged to 
“establish in detail the sufficiency of the funds available as a precondition for 
referral.”148 Sometimes the “current conditions in Rwanda” mattered, but here 
they clearly did not.149 Evaluating the working conditions for defense 
attorneys, the Tribunal acknowledged evidence of threats and arrests endured 
by lawyers who had represented accused genocidaires.150 It then dismissed 
such evidence on grounds that these threats and arrests had taken place in 
connection with proceedings in the ordinary courts (as opposed to the High 
Court where transferred cases would be heard).151 If any threats or arrests 
occurred in Gatete’s case, the High Court or Supreme Court would be under a 
duty to investigate and remedy hindrances to his defense.152 Accordingly, the 
Tribunal held that threats and harassment to attorneys did not interfere with 
 
 
79, 80–84. Because Gatete was before the Trial Chamber that heard Kanyarukiga, the fair trial analysis in 
these cases is largely identical. See Kanyarukiga Trial Decision, ¶¶ 26–97. 
 143. Gatete, Case No. ICTR-2000-61-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the 
Republic of Rwanda, ¶¶ 45, 47. 
 144. Id. ¶ 50. 
 145. Id. ¶ 46. 
 146. Id. ¶¶ 47–49. 
 147. Id. ¶¶ 48–49. 
 148. Id. ¶ 48. 
 149. The Gatete bench did not acknowledge its shift away from the Munyakazi framework. Instead, it 
made seemingly contradictory statements. First, the Trial Chamber used language from Munyakazi in its 
statement of the issue: whether the “right [to legal aid] w[ould] be ensured in practice.” Id. ¶ 47. Then, in 
the following paragraph, the Chamber held that “[i]t is not for the Chamber to venture into the question 
whether th[e] amount w[ould] be sufficient.” Id. ¶ 48 (citing Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-
23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
May 17, 2005)). Under this rationale, the availability of one dollar would support transfer, yet would 
obviously not, in practice, ensure the accused’s right to legal aid. A determination of whether the accused 
will be afforded this right in practice necessarily calls for an inquiry into the amount of funds made 
available for his defense. The flaw in the Trial Chamber’s reasoning is due to its attempt to follow 
Munyakazi’s reality-based inquiry and ICTY jurisprudence at the same time. The two are irreconcilable. 
See infra note 157. 
 150. Gatete, Case No. ICTR-2000-61-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the 
Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 52. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
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Gatete’s right to a fair trial.153 However, the Tribunal found ICTR defense 
attorneys’ previous difficulties obtaining official documents and meeting with 
detainees could affect the fairness of trial.154 Based on its analysis of the 
totality of the factors, the Tribunal concluded that Rwanda could not provide 
Gatete with a fair trial.155  
The Gatete bench purported to follow Munyakazi,156 and perhaps it did. 
But at the same time, it opened the door for Rwanda to pursue transfer with a 
legal framework argument—something Munyakazi did not recognize as the 
relevant inquiry.157 By merely stating the realities, without acknowledging the 
improbability that such would support a fair trial, the Gatete bench 
deemphasized the “current conditions of Rwanda.” Further diluting the 
reality-based approach, the Gatete bench utilized the Munyakazi loophole to 
dismiss evidence of threats and arrest endured by defense lawyers because 
they took place in connection with proceedings in the ordinary courts.158 
Although the Gatete Trial Chamber did not explicitly so state, Rwanda’s 
statutory progress was the new focus. The deferential tone of the opinion and 
 
 
 153. Id.  
 154. Id. ¶ 53. 
 155. Id. ¶ 95. 
 156. Munyakazi Appeals Decision, supra note 90. See, e.g., id. ¶ 38 (“The Appeals Chamber has also 
found that the composition of the Rwandan High Court by a single judge is not as such incompatible with 
the right to a fair trial.”); id. ¶ 61 (acknowledging that the Appeals Chamber has accepted that the 
prosecution’s administration of the witness protection program may deter fearful witnesses from using it); 
id. ¶ 87 (finding that Gatete’s transfer runs the risk of punishment inconsistent with international standards 
“conforms to case law of the Appeals Chamber”). 
 157. The Tribunal’s shift away from the reality-based analysis seems to be driven by policy and 
supported by a mixture of ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence. The 11 bis jurisprudence of the ICTY supports 
transfer where the receiving nation’s constitution, statutory scheme, and treaty participation provide for 
fair trial. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under 
Rule 11 bis, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 17, 2005), ¶¶ 52–68. Accordingly, the ICTY 
has not found reason to inquire into the “current conditions” of the former Yugoslavia; inquiry into 
statutory framework is sufficient. Id. Despite the inconsistency between the ICTY test and that of 
Munyakazi, the Gatete bench wove ICTY authority into its rationale and holdings. See, e.g., Gatete, Case 
No. ICTR-2000-61-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, 
¶ 48 n.78, ¶ 60 n.94. In so doing, it diluted Munyakazi’s reality-based test. Another potential explanation 
for the Tribunal’s shift is that Munyakazi left a loophole. In Munyakazi, the Appeals Chamber rejected 
evidence of political influence over the judiciary on the grounds that such evidence was connected to 
hearings before the Gacaca courts, and Munyakazi’s case would not be heard there. Munaykazi Appeals 
Decision, ¶ 29. Under this rationale, the Gatete Trial Chamber dismissed evidence of threats and arrests 
endured by defense counsel, stating that such instances had occurred in connection with proceedings 
before Gacaca courts. See Gatete, Case No. ICTR-2000-61-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for 
Referral to the Republic of Rwanda ¶ 52. The extension of this rationale, as applied in Munyakazi, is 
flawed. Judicial bias of the Gacaca courts has no potential to affect the trial of the accused. But the effect 
of threats made to defense counsel and arrests of same is not as easily confined. Potential defense counsel 
for the accused are unlikely to assess the risks of representing an accused genocidaire according to the 
judiciary he or she stands before—whether it be the Gacaca or the High Court.  
 158. See supra note 155. 
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the extension of the Munyakazi loophole sent a signal to Rwanda and 
Prosecutor Jallow: rewrite some statutes and apply again. And so they did.  
Just a few short days after the Gatete opinion was issued, Rwanda added a 
provision to the Abolition of the Death Penalty Law, which clarified what 
Rwanda had been arguing in its briefs to the Tribunal:159 life imprisonment 
with special provisions would not be imposed in transfer cases.160 Instead, 
transfer cases would be governed by the Transfer Law, which states that the 
highest punishment is life imprisonment.161 In early 2009, Rwanda also 
amended Article 13 of the Transfer Law to afford witnesses immunity from 
the law for statements made during trial.162 This protection would shield 
witnesses from prosecution under the “genocidal ideology” charge of 
Rwanda’s constitution.163 The 1994 regime that had sought summary 
prosecutions and death penalty judgments had begun to resemble a French or 
United Nations-type system with human rights at its core—quite a stride for a 
government comprised of the victims of the horrid atrocities that occurred 
less than two decades prior. International influence and guidance seemed to 
be expediting the healing process, statutorily speaking, anyway.164 Even then, 
the progress was limited, as the amendments’ protections were exclusive to 
transfer cases.  
V. CONDITIONS IN RWANDA AS A STANDARD IN 2010 
A. The State of Rwandan Justice in 2010 
Unfortunately, in 2010, the “conditions in Rwanda” indicated that the 
healing apparent in Rwanda’s Transfer Law did not translate into the nation’s 
reality.165 In late May 2010, American law professor Peter Erlinder was 
 
 
 159. Rwanda argued that Article 21 of the Transfer Law resolved this ambiguity, as it provides that 
where there is an inconsistency between the Transfer Law and another national statute, the text of the 
Transfer Law governs. Gatete, Case No. ICTR-2000-61-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for 
Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 85. Because the Transfer Law provides that the highest penalty is 
life imprisonment, the higher penalty of life imprisonment with special provisions would not be imposed 
in transfer cases. Id. 
 160. Organic Law No. 66/2008 of 21 Nov. 2008 Relating to the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 
Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda [hereinafter Amendment Abolishing Solitary Confinement in 
Transfer Cases]. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See Uwinkindi, Case No.ICTR-2001-75-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to 
the Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 88 n.127 (June 28, 2011) (citing Organic Law No. 03/2009/OL, Article 13 of 
26 May 2009 (amending the Transfer Law)). 
 163. See id. ¶ 95 (“The Chamber considers that Article 13 of the Transfer Law, as amended, provides 
immunity to defence witnesses and defence counsel for anything said or done in the course of a trial.”). 
 164. See supra text accompanying notes 157–59. 
 165. See generally Erlinder, supra note 48. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss2/6
  
 
 
 
 
2012] THE TROUBLE WITH TRANSFERS 527 
 
 
 
 
arrested and imprisoned for genocide denial.166 There are many theories as to 
the grounds of his arrest.167 Notably, in 2007 Erlinder successfully led the 
ICTR defense team for Major Aloys Ntabakuze, achieving Ntabakuze’s 
acquittal for “conspiracy to commit genocide.”168 When a police spokesman 
was asked to comment on the grounds for Erlinder’s arrest, he pointed to the 
professor’s statements both at the Tribunal and in publications.169 Publicly, 
the government stated that the arrest was based on Internet opinion pieces 
authored by Erlinder.170 Also relevant was Erlinder’s presence in Rwanda to 
defend presidential candidate Victoire Inagabire, who faced charges for 
genocide denial.171  
Just days before Erlinder’s arrest, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs Johnnie Carson warned Congress “that the Rwandan 
government was restricting human rights ahead of presidential elections.”172 
Human rights groups have also asserted that the Kagame regime uses the 
loose and expansive “genocidal ideology” charge to curtail opposition.173 It 
appears that, in his campaign against Inagabire, Kagame used “genocidal 
ideology” to curtail opposition twice—the first time directly, and the second 
time to imprison Inagabire’s counsel.  
While Erlinder does not dispute that he was arrested to suppress 
Inagabire’s political opposition, he also believes that his work in the 
Ntabakuze case played a part.174 This is because during the trial, he 
discovered and publicized the U.N. “Rwanda Genocide Papers,” previously 
suppressed documents that exposed evidence of RPF-led executions of Hutu 
civilians.175 Whatever the real grounds for the arrests, summary prosecutions 
under the RPF regime had taken a new form by 2010, and that form appears 
 
 
 166. Josh Kron & Jeffrey Gettleman, American Lawyer for Opposition Figure is Arrested in Rwanda, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2010, at A9. 
 167. See id.; see also Erlinder, supra note 48, at 138, 153. 
 168. Erlinder, supra note 48, at 138. 
 169. Kron & Gettleman, supra note 166.  
 170. Erlinder, supra note 48, at 153. 
 171. Id. at 133. When Victoire Inagabire “claimed that crimes committed in 1994 against Hutus by the 
ruling party had gone unpunished,” her arrest and imprisonment followed. Kron & Gettleman, supra note 
166. 
 172. Kron & Gettleman, supra note 166. 
 173. See Prosecutor v. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request 
for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 79 (June 28, 2011) (“ICDAA refers to the Rwandan laws on 
‘genocide ideology’ as ‘the most powerful weapon in Rwanda’s legal arsenal against political 
dissidents.’”). Moreover, CHRI has observed that the Kagame regime also uses arbitrary detentions as a 
means of political and social control. See CHRI REPORT, supra note 25, at 48–49. The overpopulated jails 
of Rwanda “enable the present government to sanctuarise itself in its moral superiority and to extract a 
maximum of political advantages from the situation.” Id. at 48.  
 174. Erlinder, supra note 48, at 153. 
 175. Id.  
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to be more expansive than Rwanda’s newly ratified transfer amendments 
might suggest.  
The Gacaca court proceedings taking place in Rwanda during that time 
also suggest that the country’s amendments to its Transfer Law were more a 
façade than genuine progress.176 The local Gacaca courts, which served as 
the primary adjudicative organs for the genocide, were particularly 
susceptible to corruption and administrative influence.177 Moreover, the 
informal procedures of the Gacaca courts placed accused suspects at the 
mercy of nine laymen,178 without providing any access to defense counsel.179 
Another indication that the Gacaca courts were not as impartial or as fair as 
the international community would have liked is found in the courts’ 
jurisdiction, which was limited to crimes committed against Tutsis.180 Those 
who killed Hutus were not liable before the Gacaca.181 Despite the lack of 
safeguards for the accused and the incongruity in jurisdiction, Gacaca courts 
were empowered to impose life imprisonment in isolation.182 In 2009, the 
courts exercised this authority, sentencing sexual violence offenders to life 
imprisonment in isolation.183  
In the years and months leading up to Uwinkindi, Rwanda and its 
judiciary did not appear to be guided by the principles enshrined in the recent 
amendments to the Transfer Law. This mismatch between statute and reality 
is precisely the reason for the emergence of the Munyakazi approach. But the 
Tribunal’s subsequent departure from Munyakazi did not come as a complete 
surprise. By 2010, Rwanda had managed to reduce the mismatch between 
 
 
 176. See infra notes 177–83 and accompanying text; see also CHRI REPORT, supra note 25, at 9 
(stating that Rwanda “uses [its] constitution opportunistically as a façade, which hides the exclusionary 
and repressive nature of the regime; relies on power structures that sometimes run parallel to, and 
sometimes cross-cuts the formal government . . .”).  
 177. See Ahorugeze v. Sweden, App. No. 37075/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 13 (2011) (noting concerns about 
fairness and impartiality). “[S]ome courts have spent only a few hours hearing each case and poorly 
qualified, ill-trained and corrupt gacaca judges . . . have fuelled widespread distrust of the system.” Id. at 
13–14. There have been reports of judges making false accusations of genocide for personal gain, such as 
acquisition of land. Id. at 14. 
 178. Gacaca judges are popularly elected. JONES, supra note 26, at 60. A legal education is not 
required for the post, and, upon election, the training period ranges from one to three months. See 
Constance Morrill, Reconciliation and the Gacaca: The Perceptions and Peace-Building Potential of 
Rwandan Youth Detainees, 6 OJCPR 1, 11–12 (2004), http://trinstitute.org/ojpcr/6_1morrill1.pdf. 
 179. CHRI REPORT, supra note 25, at 46. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See Amendment Abolishing Solitary Confinement in Transfer Cases, supra note 160. 
 183. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2010: RWANDA 148 (2004); see also PAUL 
CHRISTOPH BORNKAMM, RWANDA’S GACACA COURTS: BETWEEN RETRIBUTION AND REPARATION 77 
(2011) (“Gacaca courts can . . . impose prison sentences of up to 15 years upon people aged between 14 
and 17 years at the time of their crimes.”). 
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statute and reality by making all of the fair trial protections and penalty limits 
exclusive to transfer cases, of which it had none. After all, it was impossible 
to breach principles that had not yet been invoked. The troubling realities in 
Rwanda would not govern transfer cases because Rwanda promised to treat 
those cases differently. In addition to Rwanda’s dual statutory scheming, the 
ICTR had faced criticism for its decision to engage in a factual inquiry to 
deny transfers to Rwanda.184 By the time the Prosecutor had filed the 
Uwinkindi application, the ICTY had already transferred thirteen cases, each 
time applying a statutory framework analysis.185 Again, the ICTR was under 
pressure to complete its mandate and transfer cases just like its sister tribunal 
had. Transfer had plainly become the easier option, despite the persistence of 
macro-level ethical problems. 
B. Uwinkindi 
1. Factual Background 
In substance, the facts and related allegations of Uwinkindi were not 
meaningfully different from those of the transfer applications that preceded it. 
But the ICTR’s changing approach dictated a different result.  
Jean-Bosco Uwinkindi was the pastor of the Pentecostal Church of 
Kayenzi, located in Kigali-Rural prefecture.186 After President 
Habyarimana’s death on April 6, 1994, Uwinkindi allegedly sent messengers 
to Hutus in the area to invite them to his church for a meeting.187 At this 
meeting, a bourgmestre188 ordered the killing of Tutsis.189 Then, on April 7, 
1994, Uwinkindi went to a roadblock near his church and allegedly ordered 
that no Tutsi be permitted to pass.190 Tutsi civilians who were captured at the 
roadblock were brought to Uwinkindi’s church, where they were killed.191 At 
the same time, the prosecution also alleged that Uwinkindi turned Tutsis 
away from his church in early April.192 In that time period, after an attack in 
 
 
 184. See, e.g., Canter supra note 129. 
 185. See Status of Transferred Cases, UNICTY, http://www.icty.org/sid/8934 (last visited Sept. 8, 
2012). 
 186. Prosecutor v. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-I, Indictment, ¶ 2 (Sept. 11, 2001). 
 187. Id. ¶ 5. 
 188. A bourgmestre sits at the head of each commune in Rwanda. DES FORGES, supra note 9, at 41. In 
1991, there were 145 communes in Rwanda, with an average population of 40,000–50,000 people. Id. In 
the hierarchical Rwandan system of governance, bourgmestres are inferior in rank to heads of prefects and 
sub-prefects. However, in practice, bourgmestres have significant control over ordinary Rwandans. Id. 
 189. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-I, Indictment, ¶ 6. 
 190. Id. ¶ 8. 
 191. Id. ¶ 9. 
 192. Id. ¶ 10. 
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the area, Tutsis fled from their homes, and many fell victim to continued 
attacks.193 The prosecution alleged that Uwinkindi led and participated in 
these attacks.194 In July of 1994, Uwinkindi fled Rwanda.195 After his 
departure, an investigation uncovered two thousand corpses in the area 
surrounding his church.196 Uwinkindi was indicted on September 11, 2001 on 
charges of genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, and extermination as a 
crime against humanity.197  
2. The Tribunal’s Analysis of the Rule 11 bis Conditions  
Following Uwinkindi’s indictment by the ICTR, Prosecutor Jallow filed 
an application in November 2010 for transfer to Rwanda.198 First, the Referral 
Chamber assessed the current penalty structure.199 Because Rwanda had 
amended its law to address the ambiguity that troubled the Tribunal in 
Munyakazi and Gatete, life imprisonment in isolation would only be imposed 
in non-transfer cases.200 With this change, the Tribunal was satisfied that any 
penalty imposed against Uwinkindi (and in other transfer cases) would accord 
with international penal standards.201  
The Tribunal then turned its analysis to witness availability.202 Under the 
amended version of Article 13 of the Transfer Law—which provided 
witnesses with immunity for statements made during trial—the Prosecutor 
argued that witnesses’ fears of being charged with genocidal ideology were 
unfounded.203  
In response, Uwinkindi’s counsel made the same argument that had 
helped Munyakazi avoid transfer to Rwanda: the accused’s witnesses would 
not testify before the Rwandan judiciary out of fear that they would be 
“threatened, harassed, jailed or even killed.”204 Thus, the defense countered 
the prosecution’s assertion that Article 13 of the Transfer Law was sufficient 
to allay witnesses’ fears by attacking the genuineness of the amendment. And 
 
 
 193. Id. ¶¶ 13–14. 
 194. Id. ¶¶ 16–17. 
 195. Id. ¶ 25. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 1. 
 198. Prosecutor v. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for 
Referral to the Republic of Rwanda (June 28, 2011). 
 199. Id. ¶¶ 44–51. 
 200. See Amendment Abolishing Solitary Confinement in Transfer Cases, supra note 160.  
 201. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to 
the Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 51. 
 202. Id. ¶¶ 61–132. 
 203. Id. ¶ 61. 
 204. Id. ¶ 71. 
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those attacks were not without merit. When the Senate discussed adding the 
additional immunity provision to Article 13, the incumbent Minister of 
Justice had stated: 
We have nothing to lose [by granting immunity.] [I]f anything, we 
have everything to gain, by these people turning up, it will be a step 
toward their being captured. They will sign affidavits on which their 
current address will be shown and that would at any other time lead to 
their arrest.205 
Notably, Rwanda’s Genocide Fugitive Tracking Unit supervises the office 
that facilitates travel for defense witnesses and counsel.206 The minister’s 
proposal to use immunity claims to facilitate future arrests provides 
reasonable grounds for witnesses to distrust Article 13’s immunity 
provisions. Furthermore, the defense argued that, even if witnesses were to 
receive absolute immunity against further prosecution, Article 13 does not 
adequately address witness fears of abduction and murder, nor does it address 
fears that their family members might be subject to the same.207  
But the Tribunal was not persuaded by these concerns. It found for the 
Prosecutor and concluded that witnesses’ fears related to testifying before the 
Rwandan judiciary were premature in light of the immunity conferred by 
Article 13.208 Responding to the defense’s argument regarding fear of murder 
and abduction as an impediment to witness testimony, the Tribunal stated that 
its role was not to determine the legitimacy of fears, but rather “to ascertain 
that the Accused will be able to secure the appearance of witnesses on his 
behalf and thus ensure a fair trial.”209 Under this standard, the Tribunal held 
that Article 13 adequately provides for a fair trial.210 Legislative progress 
favored fair trial, which supported transfer.  
Following its determination on witness availability, the Tribunal 
commended the government of Rwanda for its willingness to change, as 
reflected in its recent statutory amendments and its rewritten and revamped 
 
 
 205. Id. ¶ 86. 
 206. Id. ¶ 87. 
 207. Id. ¶ 71. 
 208. Id. ¶ 88. 
 209. Id. ¶ 90. The defense also argued Uwinkindi’s transfer would result in double jeopardy because 
he had been convicted in absentia by the two Gacaca courts on these same facts. Id. ¶ 33. In support of this 
argument, the defense brought to light the fact that a Rwandan High Court is pursuing charges against 
accused, Leonidas Nshogoza, for charges already adjudicated by the ICTR. Id. ¶ 34. The Chamber 
dismissed the defense’s argument regarding the Nshogoza proceedings, stating that “a single case do[es] 
not provide conclusive evidence for the lack of impartiality.” Id. ¶ 35. 
 210. Id. ¶ 90. 
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witness protection programs.211 Moreover, the Tribunal noted that Rwanda’s 
brief expressed a commitment for continued self-reflection and change.212 
Specifically, Rwanda promised that legislation creating a panel to hear 
transfer cases was underway, and the panel would include judges from 
foreign or international courts.213 Another measure the Tribunal found to be 
illustrative of Rwanda’s progress was that the Minister of Justice was 
conducting a study to determine whether the constitutional concept of 
genocidal ideology is too vague or expansive in its application.214  
The Tribunal next looked to the working conditions for defense counsel in 
Rwanda, first noting that the immunities and protections of the latest 
amendments also inure to defense counsel in transfer cases.215 Turning then 
to the realities, the bench looked to the government imposed barriers which 
interfered with defense counsel’s ability to obtain official documents and 
meet with detainees. While these barriers were accorded significant weight in 
Gatete, here, they were deemed insufficient—by themselves or in 
conjunction with the other factors—to deny transfer of Uwinkindi’s case.216  
Noting the recent arrest of Peter Erlinder, the Tribunal briefly reevaluated 
the argument that defense counsel’s subjection to threats, harassment, and 
arrests interferes with the accused’s right to representation, and ultimately, to 
a fair trial.217 Rwanda had also arrested and tried ICTR defense investigator, 
Léonidas Nshogoza, for witness bribery despite his acquittal by the ICTR for 
the same.218 In so doing, the High Court violated the double jeopardy 
principle enshrined in its own statutory framework.219 The Referral Chamber 
acknowledged that these recent arrests might have a chilling effect on defense 
representation but nevertheless found that they did not preclude transfer.220 
Placing confidence in the judiciary (which had just violated its own double 
jeopardy law), the Tribunal stated that future incidents of this nature could be 
resolved by the Rwandan High Court or Supreme Court.221 After recognizing 
and dismissing the barriers to defense, the Referral Chamber reiterated that 
the protections in the Transfer Law had not yet been tested.222  
 
 
 211. Id. ¶ 101. 
 212. See id. ¶¶ 95, 114. 
 213. Id. ¶ 114. 
 214. Id. ¶ 67. 
 215. Id. ¶¶ 147–152. 
 216. Id. ¶ 161.  
 217. Id. ¶ 154. 
 218. Id. ¶ 150. 
 219. Id. ¶ 34. 
 220. Id. ¶ 161. 
 221. Id. ¶ 159. 
 222. Id. ¶ 167. 
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VI. UWINKINDI ANALYSIS 
As it had done in Gatete, the Tribunal purported to assess the “current 
conditions of Rwanda” in Uwinkindi, but its holdings were ultimately based 
on Rwanda’s newly amended Transfer Law.223 In essence, each of the 
components of the “current conditions” standard was no longer applied to the 
actual current conditions, but rather to the conditions currently dictated by the 
Transfer Law. This new approach made the transfer of Uwinkindi’s case easy 
to approve and was not without reason. Also, provisions were put in place to 
ensure the cases transferred by the ICTR were handled in accordance with the 
Transfer Law’s protections. But in allowing Rwanda to dictate the process 
legislatively, the ICTR forfeited its last, best opportunity to effect greater 
change in Rwanda’s judicial system. 
A. Witness Availability: A Disconnect Between Theory and Reality  
In examining the issue of witness availability, the Uwinkindi bench 
acknowledged the reality of witness fears but then dismissed that reality, 
finding their fears to be unwarranted.224 Perhaps attempting to undermine its 
assessment on the reasonability of these fears, the Chamber asserted that its 
job was not to determine the legitimacy of fears, but instead to ascertain 
whether Uwinkindi would be able to “obtain the attendance and examination 
of witnesses on his . . . behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against 
him.”225 In framing its task as such, the Chamber failed to acknowledge that 
the legitimacy of witness fears directly affects Uwinkindi’s ability to secure 
their appearances. Any assessment of whether he will be able to secure 
witnesses necessarily calls for an inquiry into whether those witnesses would 
in fact testify on his behalf.226 Witnesses who are afraid for their lives, 
futures, and families will not testify, despite any conference of statutory 
immunity.  
According to the Tribunal, witness refusal to testify is hypothetical, as 
Rwanda has the power to compulsorily apprehend resident witnesses.227 But 
 
 
 223. See, e.g., supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
 224. See supra text accompanying note 203. 
 225. Prosecutor v. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for 
Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 85 (June 28, 2011). 
 226. The Tribunal assumed that, because defense witnesses had testified before the High Court in 
previous genocide cases, they would also testify on behalf of Uwinkindi. Prosecutor v. Uwinkindi, Case 
No. ICTR-2001-75-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, 
¶ 100 (June 28, 2011). The number of defense witnesses who testified before the High Court in genocide 
cases was markedly less than the number of prosecution witnesses. Id. ¶ 63. 
 227. Id. ¶ 104. 
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such is hardly the case; forty-one of Uwinkindi’s witnesses are non-residents 
and therefore beyond Rwanda’s summoning power.228 Moreover, of the eight 
witnesses remaining, their forced testimony will surely be tainted by their 
fear.229 These witnesses’ fear-ridden testimony will potentially be more 
detrimental to Uwinkindi than their absence might have been—damning with 
faint corroboration, so to speak. But the Tribunal dismissed these problems, 
finding that Rwanda’s summoning procedure is a generally accepted means 
of ensuring witness testimony at trial, and therefore “cannot be properly 
regarded as prejudicial to the right to a fair trial.”230 By relying on 
international norms, the judges ignored the “current conditions of Rwanda.” 
Where witnesses are genuinely and effectively protected, there is little risk 
that their compulsory testimony will be tainted with fear. But in Rwanda, the 
summonses precede the security.231  
As Human Rights Watch highlighted in its brief to the Referral Chamber, 
the conditions in Rwanda had not improved for defense witnesses.232 They 
continued to be victimized and jailed, and they were still afraid.233 But the 
same conditions that precluded transfer in Gatete were no longer sufficient to 
do so. 
B. The Munyakazi Loophole  
By acknowledging and ignoring the realities in Rwanda, the Uwinkindi 
bench inadvertently revised the “current conditions” inquiry such that its 
application has become impossible. The Tribunal closed its eyes to Rwandan 
reality, instead homing in on transfer justice. Priming this shift in focus, the 
Chamber stated that “Rwanda ha[d] shown the willingness and the capacity 
to change by amending its relevant laws over the past two years.”234 But 
Rwanda’s willingness to amend its laws can hardly be considered a change, 
as it had been doing exactly that since the ICTR adopted Rule 11 bis. Pre-
Uwinkindi, there was a concern that Rwanda’s willingness to amend its laws 
 
 
 228. See id. ¶ 70. One of the many amendments Rwanda made to its Transfer Law allows defense 
witnesses to testify in a foreign jurisdiction before a judge or by deposition, and again, the Referral bench 
was satisfied that Rwanda had taken positive steps toward fair trial. However, neither of these options 
addresses the concern that the accused will be at a disadvantage if most of his witnesses are unable to 
provide face-to-face testimony. 
 229. See id. ¶ 104. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See supra Part V.A. 
 232. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-R11bis, ¶ 77. 
 233. Id. ¶ 99. 
 234. Id. ¶ 101. 
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was incommensurate with its willingness to change. Apparently that concern 
has been reconciled.  
Driven by its newfound trust in Rwanda, the Uwinkindi bench minimized 
the effect of arrests and victimizations on fair trial. And it continued to 
highlight the fact that the noted infractions did not fall under the statutory 
protections of the Transfer Law.235 By limiting the scope of its inquiry to the 
protections of a statute that had never before been invoked, the Tribunal 
rendered the reality-based inquiry obsolete. Munyakazi left the door open to 
this reasoning in its dismissal of evidence of injustice in the Gacaca courts on 
grounds that such influence would not affect the accused.236 Stretching this 
rationale, not even the “current conditions of Rwanda” might affect an 
accused who was not yet there. Only Rwanda’s promises and Transfer Law 
might have any bearing on Uwinkindi’s trial. The new inquiry then is 
whether the Transfer Law provides for fair trial and punishment that 
comports with international standards. Since this question was addressed and 
answered in Uwinkindi, the Tribunal has approved the transfer of seven more 
accused genocidaires, six of whom remain fugitive.237 
C. Rationale for Departing from the Munyakazi Approach 
As noted above, the reality-based inquiry was not without flaw. While the 
Referral Chamber did not explicitly state that it was departing from the 
previous approach, it did provide some rationale for doing so.238 Specifically, 
it stated that “no judicial system can guarantee absolute witness 
protection.”239 Even at the ICTR—where fair trial principles are implemented 
at great expense—witnesses often fear their testimony might invite 
repercussions.240 Furthermore, the Tribunal asserted that it was impossible to 
judge the efficacy of a statute in its abstract and that, without an opportunity 
to operate, the Transfer Law’s protections would not be able to allay 
witnesses’ fears. Viewed in this light, the reality-based approach was 
 
 
 235. See supra notes 205–07, 219 and accompanying text. 
 236. See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text. 
 237. See ICTR/Referrals—Eighth and Last ICTR Case Transferred to Rwanda for Trial, HIRONDELLE 
NEWS AGENCY (June 28, 2012), http://www.hirondellenews.org/ictr-rwanda/407-colla boration-with-
states/collaboration-with-states-rwanda/33409-280612-ictrreferrals-eighth-and-last-ictr-case-transferred-
to-rwanda-for-trial. 
 238. The Appeals Chamber was more forthcoming in holding that it was “within the scope of [the 
Referral Chamber’s] discretion [to] rely[] on the . . . legal framework as a primary basis for determining 
whether an accused will be able to secure the attendance of reluctant witnesses.” Uwinkindi v. Prosecutor, 
Case No. ICTR-2001-75-AR11bis, Decision on Uwinkindi’s Appeal Against the Referral of His Case to 
Rwanda and Related Motions, ¶ 64 (Dec. 16, 2011). 
 239. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-R11bis, ¶ 128. 
 240. See id. ¶ 102. 
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perpetuating a stalemate between the government of Rwanda and its 
witnesses. The government was without a means to dispel witnesses’ fears, 
which left the witnesses without impetus to trust in the government. 
It is easy to see how a factual inquiry into witness fear might perpetuate 
such an impasse. However, when viewed in context, the rationale behind this 
concern falls short. First, no such impasse exists here. Rwanda could allay the 
fears of all of its witnesses by adopting and implementing these protections 
nationally. Instead, Rwanda has chosen to adopt a dual statutory scheme, by 
which relevant protections inure exclusively to those involved in transfer 
cases. Second, this dual statutory scheme greatly undermines the Transfer 
Law’s potential to alleviate witness fear. Even if the protections were 
perfectly implemented, for the law to have the predicted fear-relieving effect, 
transfer witnesses would have to be able to distinguish the government’s 
treatment of witnesses in transfer cases from those in non-transfer cases. But 
witnesses’ fears are more likely to be affected by the atmosphere in Rwanda 
than by a nuanced statutory scheme, which was enacted solely for the 
purpose of attaining transfer cases. In fact, by acknowledging that witnesses 
were also afraid to testify in its own chambers, the Tribunal highlighted the 
problem: Rwandan witnesses fear Rwandan repercussions.  
Like other issues before it, the Tribunal did not address the witness fear 
impasse head-on but used it to support its departure from the “current 
conditions” approach. Had the Tribunal explicitly acknowledged the flaws in 
that approach, it might have created a new standard, fit for Rwanda. Instead, 
it inadvertently endorsed Rwanda’s dual statutory scheme and its limited and 
imperfect protections. 
VII. REVOCATION: A TEMPORARY SOLUTION FOR TRANSFERRED CASES 
A. 11 bis Monitoring and Revocation Mechanism 
Fortunately for Uwinkindi and the other transferees, Rule 11 bis contains 
a monitoring and revocation provision which allows the ICTR to monitor 
Uwinkindi’s trial in Rwanda and revoke the transfer if he is not afforded a 
fair trial.241 This mechanism allows the Tribunal to give Rwanda’s newly 
written laws an opportunity to function and thereby furthers one of the 
Tribunal’s initial objectives of reconciliation and judicial capacity building.242 
However, the monitoring and revocation mechanism is not without criticism. 
The primary criticism voiced has been that the monitoring and revocation 
 
 
 241. See Rule 11 bis (F), supra note 63. 
 242. See S.C. Res. 955, supra note 30. 
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mechanism cannot ensure that the witnesses of the accused will testify and 
receive protection in so doing.243 Indeed, it would be difficult to ascertain 
beforehand whether witnesses who would have testified at the Tribunal will 
actually testify in Rwanda. That said, Uwinkindi has attracted substantial 
attention from international human rights groups244 and, accordingly, is sure 
to be monitored with the utmost scrutiny. In addition, the ICTR has appointed 
two of its own monitors and is negotiating with an independent agency, 
which will also monitor the proceedings, further ensuring scrutiny over the 
Rwandan judiciary.245 Rwanda has promised to grant the monitors access to 
the court proceedings, documents, and records.246 And with the eyes of the 
international community watching over Uwinkindi, Rwanda will probably 
stay true to its promises, resulting in a fair trial—at least for Uwinkindi. 
However, it is unclear whether the Rwandan judiciary as a whole will make 
the larger policy changes hoped for. 
B. A Dangerous Signal: Legitimizing a Flawed System to the 
International Community 
The danger of Uwinkindi, then, is not its application to the named accused, 
but rather in its precedent. When the Tribunal issues an opinion, it writes 
international law, binding on its chambers and applicable at the transnational 
 
 
 243. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR-00-55B-R11bis, Decision on the 
Prosecution’s Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 29 (Dec. 4, 2008) (stating that 
monitoring and revocation “procedures and remedies would not necessarily solve the current problems 
related to the availability and protection of witnesses”) (citing Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-
2002-78-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecution’s Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11bis, 
¶ 38 (Oct. 30, 2008) (same)); Prosecutor v. Gatete, Case No. ICTR-2000-61-R11bis, Decision on 
Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 94 (Nov. 17, 2008) (“[M]onitoring will 
not . . . solve the problems relating to availability and protection of witnesses . . . .”). Another criticism 
noted by the Tribunal in previous cases was that the OTP had sole discretion over the monitoring and 
revocation, leaving the accused with no means to challenge the fairness of the trial. See, e.g., Kanyarukiga, 
Case No. ICTR-2002-78-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecution’s Appeal Against Decision on Referral 
Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 38 (“[B]oth the decision to send monitors and the right to request a Trial Chamber to 
consider revocation lie within the sole discretion of the Prosecution. Therefore, the Accused would not be 
able himself to trigger the operation of these ‘remedies’.”); Hategikimana, Case No. ICTR-00-55B-
R11bis, Decision on the Prosecution’s Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 29 
(same). However, Rule 11 bis was amended, enabling the Chamber to appoint a monitor, making this 
criticism obsolete in Uwinkindi. See Prosecutor v. Uwinkindi, Case No ICTR-2001-75-R11bis, Decision 
on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 205 (June 28, 2011). 
 244. Human Rights Watch and the International Criminal Defence Attorneys Association filed briefs 
on Uwinkindi’s behalf and both have been monitoring the actual progress of the Rwandan judiciary. See 
Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-R11bis. 
 245. Prosecutor v. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-01-75R11bis, Decision on the Monitoring 
Arrangements for the Trial of Jean Uwinkindi in the Republic of Rwanda, 6–7 (Apr. 5, 2012). 
 246. Prosecutor v. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR–2001–75–R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request 
for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 209 (June 28, 2011). 
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level as well. Prior to Uwinkindi, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
Switzerland, and Finland all denied extradition requests from Rwanda on fair 
trial grounds.247 Notably, in each of these denials, the courts deferred to the 
Tribunal’s findings regarding the flaws within Rwanda’s maturing 
judiciary.248 But in Uwinkindi, under the guise of recognizing progress in 
Rwanda’s justice system, the Tribunal necessarily ignored certain flaws in 
that system.249 The effects of this disregard of Rwanda’s “current conditions” 
are two-fold. The first effect is that Rwanda will now have the opportunity to 
apply its newly written statutes. This result is in accord with one of the aims 
of the Tribunal, to build the capacity of the Rwandan judiciary.250 The second 
effect appears to be more of an externality. By relinquishing its jurisdiction 
over a high-level accused, the Tribunal generally signaled to the rest of the 
world that Rwanda is ready to try all of its suspects.251 This signal will affect 
the fate of many Rwandan accuseds who are residing in Europe and 
Canada,252 whose rights, unlike those of Uwinkindi, will remain 
unprotected.253  
The monitoring and revocation mechanism of Rule 11 bis helps to 
maintain a vertical hierarchy between the Tribunal and Rwanda.254 
Uwinkindi’s transfer affords Rwanda an opportunity to develop its judiciary, 
but not at the expense of Uwinkindi’s fundamental rights.255 If Rwanda’s 
imposition of justice upon Uwinkindi begins to resemble that of the country’s 
lower courts, the Tribunal can revoke the transfer.256 In contrast, the 
horizontal structure of extradition is inherently without such a safeguard.257 
After a nation extradites an accused, that nation is without power to revoke 
 
 
 247. See, e.g., Brown v. Gov’t of Rwanda, [2009] EWHC (Admin) 770, (U.K.), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49f848212.html; Ahorugeze v. Sweden, App. No. 37075/09, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 1, 22–23 (2011); Press Release, Finnish Ministry of Justice, Genocide Suspect not to be Extradited to 
Rwanda (Feb. 20, 2009), http://www.om.fi/en/Etusivu/Ajankohtaista/Uutiset/Uutisarkisto/Uutiset2009/ 
1232607458297. 
 248. See Ahorugeze, App. No. 37075/09, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 22–24. 
 249. See supra Part VI. 
 250. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 30. 
 251. See Ahorugeze, App. No. 37075/09, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 37–39. 
 252. See Schurr, infra note 262; Philippa Croome & Bosco Hitimana, Mugasera Case Paves Way for 
More Rwanda Deportations, Prosecutor Says, THE TORONTO STAR, Jan. 25, 2012, http://www.thestar 
.com/news/world/article/1121516--mugesera-case-paves-way-for-more-rwanda-deportations-prosecutor-
says.  
 253. See Ahorugeze, App. No. 37075/09, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 32. In 2009, the Rwandan legislature made 
the Transfer Law applicable to extradition, but without monitoring or revocation available as safeguards, 
the assurances of the Transfer Law carry little weight. See Transfer Law, supra note 84, arts. 1, 24. 
 254. See supra Part VII. 
 255. See id.  
 256. See Rule 11bis (E), supra note 63. 
 257. See Ahorugeze, App. No. 37075/09, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 32. 
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that extradition.258 Despite this significant difference between transfer and 
extradition cases, on October 27, 2011, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) made transfer jurisprudence binding on extradition cases.259 In 
Ahourogeze v. Sweden, the ECHR granted the extradition of a suspect from 
Sweden to Rwanda, holding that his extradition would not violate the 
European Convention on Human Rights and comported with the accused’s 
right to a fair trial.260 Notably, Norway and Canada have each granted a post-
Uwinkindi extradition request from Rwanda.261  
The implications of the ECHR’s green light to extradite are significant. 
Following the atrocities of 1994, hundreds of Rwandan suspects left the 
country,262 and Rwanda has expressed a commitment to bring them to 
justice.263 At the time of this writing, Rwanda has more than forty pending 
extradition requests for Rwandans residing in Europe and nine more for 
Rwandans in Canada.264 As the influx of extraditions begins, the international 
community is without power to remedy any miscarriages of justice that may 
arise at the hands of the Rwandan judiciary.265 The rights of Uwinkindi and 
the other ICTR transferees will likely be protected, but the rights of the 
extradited accuseds who follow them may not.266 It can only be hoped that 
the faith placed in Rwanda’s maturing system of justice was not premature. 
VIII. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: TAILORED INQUIRY  
Through its application of the 11 bis conditions and the monitoring 
mechanism, the ITCR will be able to fulfill its obligation to provide its 
indictees with certain rights and protections. The ICTR has allowed the 
Rwandan judiciary to complete the ICTR mandate (i.e., the prosecution of 
ICTR indictees), and there appear to be adequate safeguards for its proper 
completion. In that sense, the Tribunal’s mission has been accomplished. But 
other goals of the ICTR’s creation seem to have been abandoned in the 
process. In particular, it is doubtful that the U.N.’s stated judicial capacity 
 
 
 258. Id.  
 259. See generally Ahorugeze, App. No. 37075/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
 260. Id. at 39. 
 261. See Prosecutor v. Munyagishari, Case No. ICTR-2005-89-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Request for Referral of the Case to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶¶ 43–44 (June 6, 2012); Mark B. Taylor, A 
Nordic Safe Haven No More?, THE LAWS OF RULE (Nov. 24, 2011), http://www.lawsofrule.net/2011/ 
11/24/2152/. 
 262. Juergen Schurr, Green Light—Sweden to Rwanda Genocide Extradition, INT’L JUST. TRIB. (Nov. 
7, 2011), http://www.rnw.nl/international-justice/article/green-light-sweden-rwanda-genocide-extradition. 
 263. See generally id. 
 264. Id.; Croome & Hitimana, supra note 252. 
 265. See supra note 257 and accompanying text. 
 266. See id. 
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building goal was limited to enabling the Rwandan judiciary to carry out the 
ICTR’s own mandate. Had the ICTR tailored its application of the 11 bis 
conditions to the Rwandan context, the effects of those conditions could have 
been much greater, potentially transforming Rwanda’s larger approach to 
human rights and due process.  
Because Uwinkindi’s transfer will affect the extraditions to come, the 
ICTR should not have limited its inquiry to the conditions that might affect 
Uwinkindi. Instead, the Tribunal should have looked at the judicial culture in 
the country, pushing Rwanda to make the transfer protections applicable in 
all cases. This approach on its own might not be sufficient to transform an 
entire judicial system, but it would have bought time. While requiring 
Rwanda to broaden the scope of its protections, the Tribunal could have 
invited Rwandan prosecutors and judges to play a bigger role in the ICTR 
proceedings, providing opportunities for both buy-in and training. Instead, the 
Tribunal accepted Rwanda’s flawed (and disingenuous) scheme to win 
transfer. And, in so doing, it has given up an opportunity to effect lasting 
change. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Almost eighteen years after the atrocities in Rwanda, the Tribunal has 
found both the means and a rationale to reduce its role. During its years of 
service, the ICTR has prosecuted genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity. But in its decision to hand control over to Rwanda, a significant 
part of its mission has been left unfulfilled: “to strengthen the courts and 
judicial system of Rwanda.”267  
The ICTR will soon hand over to the High Court the last accused in U.N. 
custody, Bernard Munyagashari.268 Had the Tribunal retained Uwinkindi and 
Munyagishari and invited Rwanda to work with it on those cases, it might 
have slowed the extraditions and even changed conditions under which 
extradited cases would be heard. Instead, the ICTR is shutting down, satisfied 
in having fulfilled its obligation to ensure that all of its indictees have 
received or will receive fair trials.269 But there is a real sense of a job left 
 
 
 267. See S.C. Res. 955, supra note 30. 
 268. See Prosecutor v. Munyagishari, Case No. ICTR-2005-89-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Request for Referral of the Case to the Republic of Rwanda (June 6, 2012). 
 269. See Status of Cases, INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, http://www.unictr.org/Cases/tab 
id/204/Default.aspx (last visited Nov. 12, 2012) (88 cases have been tried before the Tribunal, and two 
cases were transferred to France); see also ICTR/Referrals—Eighth and Last ICTR CASE Transferred to 
Rwanda for Trial, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY (June 28, 2012), http://hirondellenews.org/ictr-rwanda/ 
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undone and an opportunity lost. Furthermore, the transfers of Uwinkindi and 
Munyagishari convey a dangerous false message to the international 
community: that the transformation of the Rwanda’s judiciary is complete, 
and Rwanda can be counted on to handle all of its cases in accord with 
international standards of justice. 
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